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Abstract—Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols ensure
that a user can download a file from a database without revealing
any information on the identity of the requested file to the servers
storing the database. While existing protocols strictly impose that
no information is leaked on the file’s identity, this work initiates
the study of the tradeoffs that can be achieved by relaxing the per-
fect privacy requirement. We refer to such protocols as weakly-
private information retrieval (WPIR) protocols. In particular, for
the case of multiple noncolluding replicated servers, we study how
the download rate, the upload cost, and the access complexity
can be improved when relaxing the full privacy constraint. To
quantify the information leakage on the requested file’s identity
we consider mutual information (MI), worst-case information
leakage, and maximal leakage (MaxL). We present two WPIR
schemes based on two recent PIR protocols and show that the
download rate of the former can be optimized by solving a convex
optimization problem. Additionally, a family of schemes based on
partitioning is presented. Moreover, we provide an information-
theoretic converse bound for the maximum possible download
rate for the MI and MaxL privacy metrics under a practical
restriction on the alphabet size of queries and answers. For two
servers and two files, the bound is tight under the MaxL metric,
which settles the WPIR capacity in this particular case. Finally,
we compare the performance of the proposed schemes and their
gap to the converse bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) was introduced in the
computer science literature by Chor et al. in [1], [2]. A PIR
scheme allows a user to retrieve an arbitrary file from a
database that is stored on either a single or multiple servers
without revealing any information about the identity of the
requested file. The efficiency of a PIR scheme is measured in
terms of the total communication load, consisting of both the
upload and download cost for the retrieval of a single file. It
was already shown in the original work of Chor et al. [2] that
in the case that the database is stored on a single server, all files
need to be downloaded in order to achieve full privacy, i.e.,
no information leakage on the identity of the requested file. It
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has been extensively studied how to reduce the communication
load using several copies of the database, see, e.g., [3]–[6].
From an information-theoretic perspective and for many
practical scenarios, the file size is typically much larger
than the size of the queries to all servers. Therefore, rather
than accounting for both the upload and the download cost,
as usually done in the computer science literature, in the
information theory literature efficiency is typically measured
in terms of the download cost, or equivalently, in terms of
the download rate. The download rate—or the PIR rate—is
defined as the ratio between the requested file size and the
average number of downloaded symbols for the retrieval of
a single file. The maximum possible PIR rate of all possible
schemes is called the PIR capacity. The PIR capacity for the
classical PIR model of replicated servers was characterized by
Sun and Jafar [7].
To achieve a lower storage overhead, PIR protocols have
also been considered jointly with coded distributed storage
systems (DSSs), where the data is encoded by a linear code
and then stored on several servers in a distributed manner [8]–
[10]. The case of maximum distance separable (MDS) coded
servers was considered in [11], [12], while the case of arbitrary
linear coded servers was studied in [13]–[15]. The concept of
PIR has also been extended to several other relevant scenarios,
which include colluding servers [11], [13], [15]–[19], robust
PIR [16], PIR with Byzantine servers [20], optimal upload
cost of PIR, i.e., the minimum required amount of query
information [21], access complexity of PIR, i.e., the number of
symbols accessed across all servers for the retrieval of a single
file [22], single-server PIR with private side information [23],
PIR on graph-based replication systems [24], PIR with secure
storage [25], functional PIR codes [26], and private proximity
retrieval codes [27].
All of the aforementioned extensions of PIR impose full
privacy, i.e., no information leakage. However, this assumption
is quite restrictive and may be relaxed for several practical
applications, as leaking part of the information of the identity
of the requested file is legitimate as long as there is still enough
ambiguity on the file’s identity to meet the privacy requirement
specified by the user. For example, the user may be willing to
share with the servers that the file is a movie (and not a book
or other forms of files), or only the movie’s genre, whereas
keeping private the identity of the movie. Relaxing the full
privacy requirement of PIR has been considered briefly in the
computer science literature previously. As early as in 2002,
Asonov et al. [28] introduced the concept of repudiation as
a relaxation of PIR. Their main motivation was to reduce the
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2preprocessing complexity of queries, while keeping optimal
communication (upload and download) cost and response time.
However, the condition of repudiation can be achieved even
if the server can determine the identity of the requested file
almost surely. Hence, it does not provide a good level of
information-theoretic privacy. More than a decade later, Toledo
et al. [29] adopted a privacy metric based on differential
privacy and traded off privacy for reduced communication
cost. In [29], several schemes that hide the query identity were
proposed and studied.
This paper takes a first step away from the full privacy
requirement of the information-theoretic PIR framework. Our
goal is to study the tradeoffs between different parameters
of PIR, such as download rate, upload cost, and access
complexity, while relaxing the perfect privacy requirement
on the identity of the desired file. We refer to such a sce-
nario as weakly-private information retrieval (WPIR). How
to properly measure information leakage has been studied
extensively in the computer science literature, see, e.g., [30]
and references therein. Mutual information (MI), maximal
leakage (MaxL) [31], [32], and worst-case information leakage
(WIL) [33] are among the most popular information-theoretic
privacy leakage metrics, along with (local) differential privacy
[34], [35]. In this work, we consider the case of replicated
noncolluding servers, mainly focusing on the MI and MaxL
privacy metrics. We propose a WPIR scheme by building
upon a PIR protocol recently introduced in [21] and study
its tradeoffs between download rate, upload cost, and access
complexity. In particular, we show that by relaxing the strong
privacy requirement, the download rate can be improved
beyond PIR capacity.
The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce the concept of an (M, n) information
retrieval (IR) scheme for a DSS with n servers storing
M files using a global random strategy vector and a cor-
responding scheme, referred to as Scheme 1, by building
upon a PIR protocol introduced in [21]. By selecting
each entry of the global random strategy according to
a Bernoulli distribution, we provide for the special case
of n = 2 servers closed-form expressions for the achiev-
able download rate, upload cost, access complexity, and
privacy leakage (see Theorem 3).
• By using a time-sharing argument (see Theorem 1 and the
discussion in Section VI), the download rate of Scheme 1
can be improved. For both the MI and MaxL privacy
metrics we show that optimizing the download rate for
Scheme 1 with time-sharing over the global random
strategy can be framed as a convex optimization problem
(see Section VI).
• We provide an information-theoretic converse result for
the maximum possible download rate for an (M, n)
IR scheme for both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics
in Theorems 7 and 9, respectively, under a practical
restriction on the alphabet size of queries and answers.
The converse is derived using a known result between the
entropy difference and the total variation (TV) distance
of two probability distributions (see Lemma 4). For the
special case of (M, n) = (2, 2) the WPIR capacity is
provided in Theorems 8 (assuming that only one of the
two servers can leak) and 10 for the MI and MaxL
privacy metrics, respectively. Moreover, we show that
Scheme 1 with time-sharing and with each entry of the
global random strategy selected according to a Bernoulli
distribution achieves the WPIR capacity for both privacy
metrics under the above restrictions in this special case.
• Extensive numerical results showing the tradeoff be-
tween download rate, upload cost, access complexity,
and privacy leakage are presented in Section IX for
Scheme 1. As a comparison, we also compare with an
alternative proposed constant-rate IR scheme, referred to
as Scheme 2 and based on the PIR scheme in [13, Sec. V].
A. Related Work
Independently, the download rate-complexity tradeoff has
been studied by Samy et al. [36] under the name of leaky
PIR using a privacy metric related to differential privacy. The
leaky PIR framework was recently also extended to symmetric
PIR [37] and to the consideration of latent attributes in the
single server case [38]. Symmetric PIR is a variant of PIR
where in addition the user cannot learn anything about the
remaining files in the database when the user retrieves its
desired file [39]. Moreover, Zhou et al. [40] have recently
studied the same problem under the MaxL privacy metric.
Their scheme builds upon the same PIR protocol as our
proposed Scheme 1. Moreover, by allowing for a permutation
of the query strategy across the servers in addition to an
arbitrary global random strategy, improved performance can
be achieved. It can be shown that their scheme is equivalent
to our Scheme 1 with time-sharing.
Our companion paper [41] studies the corresponding prob-
lem for the single server setting under both MI and MaxL
privacy metrics. In particular, by relating the WPIR problem
to rate-distortion theory, the capacity of single-server WPIR
is fully characterized. Lastly, the related work in [42] is also
worth mentioning. In contrast to WPIR, where information
leakage on the identity of the desired file to the servers is
considered, the information leakage of the nondesired files to
the user for classical PIR was studied in [42].
B. Organization of Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the notation, basic definitions, preliminaries,
and the problem formulation. In Section III, we present a
partition scheme which first divides the database into equally-
sized partitions and then uses a given IR scheme to retrieve a
file from the corresponding partition. Section IV presents an IR
scheme built upon the PIR protocol introduced in [21], referred
to as Scheme 1, while Section V presents a constant-rate IR
scheme based on the PIR scheme in [13, Lem. 4], referred to as
Scheme 2. For both schemes and for two servers we provide
closed-form expressions for the download rate, upload cost,
access complexity, and information leakage under a Bernoulli
global random strategy. In Section IV, using Scheme 1 to
retrieve files from a partition of the partition scheme is also
analyzed. The minimization of the information leakage for
3Scheme 1 with time-sharing is considered in Section VI. In
particular, we show that the minimization problem is a convex
optimization problem for both the MI and MaxL privacy
metrics. Then, in Sections VII and VIII we present converse
results on the minimum download cost for both privacy metrics
under a practical restriction on the alphabet size of queries
and answers. Numerical results comparing Schemes 1 and 2
in terms of download rate, upload cost, access complexity, and
information leakage are presented in Section IX. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
We denote by N the set of all positive integers, [a] ,
{1, 2, . . . , a}, and [a : b] , {a, a+1, . . . , b} for a, b ∈ {0}∪N,
a ≤ b. Vectors are denoted by bold letters, random variables
(RVs) (either scalar or vector) by uppercase letters, and sets by
calligraphic uppercase letters, e.g., x, X , and X , respectively.
Moreover, X c denotes the complement of a set X in a
universe set. For a given index set S, we write XS and YS
to represent
{
X(m) : m ∈ S} and {Yl : l ∈ S}, respectively.
X ⊥ Y means that the two RVs X and Y are independent.
EX [·] denotes expectation over the RV X . X ∼ Bernoulli(p)
denotes a Bernoulli-distributed RV with Pr[X = 1] = p =
1 − Pr[X = 0] and X ∼ U(S) a uniformly-distributed RV
over the set S. (·)T denotes the transpose of its argument. The
Hamming weight of a binary vector x is denoted by wH(x),
while its support is denoted by χ(x). The inner product of
x and y is denoted by 〈x,y〉. EX [·] and EPX [·] denote
expectation with respect to the RV X and distribution PX ,
respectively. H(X), H(PX), or H
(
p1, . . . , p|X |
)
represents the
entropy of X , where PX(·) = (p1, . . . , p|X |) denotes the
distribution of the RV X , while I(X ;Y ) is the MI between
X and Y . With some abuse of notation, when the marginal
distribution of either X or Y is assumed fixed and known,
the MI between X and Y is sometimes simply written as
I(X ;Y ) ≡ I(PX|Y ) ≡ I(PY |X).
B. System Model
We consider a DSS with n noncolluding replicated servers,
each storing M independent files X(1), . . . ,X(M), where
each file X(m) =
(
X
(m)
1 , . . . , X
(m)
β
)T
, m ∈ [M], can be seen
as a β×1 vector over an alphabet X . Assume that each element
of X(m) is chosen independently and uniformly at random
from X . Thus, we have H(X(m)) = β log2 |X |, ∀m ∈ [M].
In information retrieval (IR), a user wishes to efficiently
retrieve one of the M files stored in the replicated DSS. Similar
to the detailed mathematical description in [21], we assume
that the requested file index M is a RV and M ∼ U([M]).
We give the following definition of an IR scheme.
Definition 1. An (M, n) IR scheme C for a DSS with n servers
storing M files consists of:
• A global random strategy S, whose alphabet is S.
• n query-encoding functions φl, l ∈ [n], that generate n
queries Ql = φl(M,S) with alphabet Ql, where query
Ql is sent to server l.
• n answer functions ϕl that return the answers Al =
ϕl(Ql,X
[M]), with alphabet A for all l ∈ [n].
• n answer-length functions `l(Ql), with range {0} ∪ N,
that define the length of the answers.
• n access-number functions δl(Ql), with range {0} ∪ N,
that define the number of symbols accessed by Ql.
This scheme should satisfy the condition of perfect retrievabil-
ity,
H
(
X(M)
∣∣A[n],Q[n],M) = 0. (1)
Since a user should be able to generate the queries without
any prior knowledge of the realizations of the messages, it is
reasonable to assume that the queries and the messages are
independent, i.e.,
I(X [M] ;Q[n]) = 0. (2)
This particular assumption is used in the converse proofs of
Sections VII and VIII (see Appendix D).
Note that a PIR scheme is an (M, n) IR scheme that satisfies
full privacy for all servers, i.e., for every m,m′ ∈ [M] with
m 6= m′, the condition
Pr[Ql = ql |M = m] = Pr[Ql = ql |M = m′] (3)
holds for all ql ∈ Ql, l ∈ [n]. The privacy constraint (3) is
equivalent to the statement that M ⊥ Ql. We denote by Q(m)l
the query sent to server l if file X(m) is requested, which
is a RV with probability mass function (PMF) P
Q
(m)
l
(ql) ,
Pr[Ql = ql |M = m].
We refer to an (M, n) IR scheme that does not satisfy (3)
as a WPIR scheme, as opposed to a PIR scheme that leaks no
information.
C. Metrics of Information Leakage
In this paper, to measure the information leakage between
M and Ql for an IR scheme, we first consider MI. Moreover,
we also consider WIL [33] and MaxL, which is considered a
robust information leakage quantity [32]. For the MI privacy
metric, we use the following theorem to motivate the definition
of information leakage for an (M, n) IR scheme.
Theorem 1 (Time-Sharing Principle for the MI Metric).
Consider an (M, n) IR scheme C , where the leakage of the
l-th server is defined as I(M ;Ql), l ∈ [n]. Then, there exists
an (M, n) IR scheme C with leakage ρ¯ , 1n
∑
l∈[n] I(M ;Ql)
for every server.
Proof: The theorem is proven by a time-sharing argument.
Assume that the IR scheme C is given by the query-encoding
functions φl, answer functions ϕl, l ∈ [n], and a random
strategy S.
Next, define query-encoding functions φ¯l, answer functions
ϕ¯l, l ∈ [n], and a random strategy ST for an (M, n) IR scheme
C as follows. Given a requested file index M , the user chooses
a T ∼ U([n]) and assigns the query Ql = φ¯l(M,ST ) ,
φσT−1(l)(M,S) = QσT−1(l)(M,S) to the l-th server, l ∈ [n],
where σ(·) denotes a left cyclic permutation.
The answer functions for C are defined as ϕ¯l
(
Ql,X
[M]
)
,
ϕσT−1(l)
(
φσT−1(l)(M,S),X
[M]
)
, l ∈ [n], and hence perfect
4retrievability is achieved due to the perfect retrievability of the
IR scheme C .
The MI information leakage of the l-th server is
I(M ;Ql) = H
(
Ql
)− H(Ql ∣∣M)
= H
(
QσT−1(l)
)− H(QσT−1(l) ∣∣M)
(a)
=
n∑
t=1
Pr[T = t] I(Qσt−1(l) ;M |T = t)
=
1
n
n∑
l′=1
I(Ql′ ;M), ∀ l ∈ [n],
where (a) follows from the definition of conditional mutual
information.
Theorem 1 indicates that we can always obtain an (M, n)
IR scheme with equal MI leakage at each server by cyclically
shifting the servers’ queries of an existing (M, n) IR scheme
C n times. Such a time-sharing scheme is denoted by C .
Hence, to characterize the overall leakage of a given (M, n)
IR scheme C in terms of MI, we consider the information
leakage metric
ρ(MI)(C ) , 1
n
∑
l∈[n]
I(M ;Ql). (4)
The WIL of the l-th server is defined as WIL(M ;Ql) ,
H(M) − minql∈Ql H(M |Ql = ql). The overall WIL of a
given (M, n) IR scheme C is then given as ρ(WIL)(C ) ,
maxl∈[n] WIL(M ;Ql).
Further, given a joint distribution PM,Q, the MaxL from M
to Q is defined as
MaxL(M ;Q) , log2
∑
q∈Q
max
m∈[M]
PQ|M (q|m). (5)
Note that MaxL has a strong connection to the min-
entropy (MinE) privacy metric, which is commonly-used in
the computer science literature [31], [43]. MinE is a special
case of the widely known Rényi entropy [44]. The MinE
information leakage and the MaxL privacy metric can be
shown to be equivalent when M is uniformly distributed [32],
[43]. Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that there is a
close relation between MaxL and differential privacy [35], see,
e.g., [43, Thm. 3].
We will use (5) as the MaxL privacy metric for the designed
query distribution PQl|M at the l-th server of a WPIR scheme,
which is denoted by
ρ(MaxL)(M,Ql) , MaxL(M ;Ql).
The overall MaxL of a given (M, n) IR scheme C is then
defined as
ρ(MaxL)(C ) , max
l∈[n]
MaxL(M ;Ql).
The following corollary summarizes some useful properties
for both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics.
Lemma 1 ([32, Lem. 1, Cor. 1]). For any joint distribution
PX,Y , we have the following.
1) (Data Processing Inequalities) If the RVs X,Y , and Z
form a Markov chain, then
I(X ;Z) ≤ min{I(X ;Y ), I(Y ;Z)}, and
MaxL(X ;Z) ≤ min{MaxL(X ;Y ),MaxL(Y ;Z)}.
2) Consider a fixed distribution PX . Then, both I(X ;Y ) and
2MaxL(X ;Y ) are convex functions in PY |X .
Throughout the paper, the information leakage metric of a
WPIR scheme C is denoted by ρ(·)(C ), where the superscript
indicates the leakage metric (MI, WIL, or MaxL) we are
considering. Moreover, since PM is fixed, we will also simply
write the leakage measure ρ(·)(·, ·) as a function of the
designed query distribution PQl|M of a WPIR scheme. For
example, ρ(MI)(M,Ql) ≡ I(PQl|M ) ≡ ρ(MI)(PQl|M ), l ∈ [n].
D. Download Cost, IR Rate, Upload Cost, and Access Com-
plexity of an (M, n) IR Scheme
For WPIR, in contrast to PIR, the download cost may be
different for the retrieval of different files. Thus, the download
cost can be defined as the expected download cost over all
possible requested files. The download cost of a WPIR scheme
C for the retrieval of the m-th file, denoted by D(m)(C ), is
defined as the expected length of the returned answers across
all servers over all random queries,
D(m)(C ) , log2|A|
n∑
l=1
E
Q
(m)
l
[
`l(Q
(m)
l )
]
.
The overall download cost of an IR scheme C , denoted by
D(C ), is defined as the expected download cost over all files,
i.e.,
D(C ) , log2 |A|EM
[
n∑
l=1
E
Q
(m)
l
[`l(Ql)]
]
= log2 |A|
n∑
l=1
EQl [`l(Ql)].
Accordingly, the IR rate of an IR scheme C is defined as
R(C ) , β log2 |X |
D(C )
.
The upload cost U(C ) of an IR scheme C is defined as the
sum of the entropies of the queries Q[n],
U(C ) ,
n∑
l=1
H(Ql).
Moreover, the access complexity ∆(C ) of an IR scheme C
is defined as the expected number of accessed symbols across
all servers for the retrieval of a single file,
∆(C ) ,
n∑
l=1
EQl [δl(Ql)] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
n∑
l=1
E
Q
(m)
l
[δl(Ql)]. (6)
An achievable 4-tuple of an IR scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding servers
storing M files. A 4-tuple (R,U,∆, ρ) is said to be achievable
with information leakage metric ρ(·) if there exists an (M, n)
5IR scheme C such that R(C ) = R, U(C ) = U, ∆(C ) = ∆,
and ρ(·)(C ) = ρ.
We remark that a PIR scheme corresponds to an (M, n)
IR scheme with ρ(·) = 0. It was shown in [7] that for n
noncolluding replicated servers and for a given number of files
M, the PIR capacity, denoted by CM,n, is CM,n =
(
1+ 1/n+
· · ·+ 1/nM−1)−1.
III. PARTITION WPIR SCHEME
A simple approach for the construction of WPIR schemes
is to first partition the database into η equally-sized partitions,
each consisting of M/η files where M/η ∈ N,1 and then
use a given (M/η, n) IR scheme to retrieve a file from the
corresponding partition. Obviously, the resulting scheme is
not a PIR scheme, since the servers gain the knowledge of
which partition the requested file belongs to. In this section,
we pursue this approach to construct an (M, n) IR scheme
building on a given (M/η, n) IR scheme as a subscheme.
The partition (M, n) WPIR scheme is formally described as
follows. Assume the requested file X(m) belongs to the j-th
partition, where j ∈ [η]. Then, the query Ql is constructed as
Ql =
(rQl, j) ∈ Q˜l × [η], l ∈ [n], (7)
where rQl is the query of an existing (M/η, n) IR scheme C˜ .
The following theorem states the achievable 4-tuple of the
partition scheme.
Theorem 2. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding servers
storing M files, and let C˜ be an (M/η, n) IR scheme with
achievable 4-tuple
(
R˜, U˜, ∆˜, ρ˜(·)
)
. Then, the 4-tuple(
R(C ),U(C ),∆(C ), ρ(·)(C )
)
=
(
R˜, U˜+ n log2 η, r∆, ρ˜(·) + log2 η) (8)
is achievable by the (M, n) partition scheme C constructed
from C˜ as described in (7).
Proof: Without loss of generality, denote the requested
file index M by M ≡ (MJ , J), where MJ denotes the
requested file index in the J-th partition. The MI based leakage
at the l-th server, l ∈ [n], is given as
I(M ;Ql) = H(M)− H(M |Ql)
= H(MJ , J)− H(MJ , J | rQl, J)
= H(J) + H(MJ |J)− H(MJ | rQl, J)
(a)
= H(J) + H(MJ)− H(MJ | rQl)
= log2 η + I(MJ ; rQl), (9)
where (a) follows since MJ and J are assumed to be uniform
RVs, and hence knowing J does not reveal any information
about the requested file index MJ . Using (9) in (4) gives
ρ(MI)(C ). Using a similar argument as above, the expressions
for R(C ), U(C ), ∆(C ), ρ(WIL)(C ), and ρ(MaxL)(C ) can be
derived accordingly.
1While it is not necessary that each partition has an equal number of files,
for simplicity in this paper we make this assumption.
TABLE I
THE JOINT PMF OF Q1,Q2 FOR 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 , GIVEN M = 1, 2.
P
Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2
(q1, q2) q2 = (1, 0) q2 = (0, 1) P
Q
(1)
1
(q1)
q1 = (0, 0) 1− p 0 1− p
q1 = (1, 1) 0 p p
P
Q
(1)
2
(q2) 1− p p
(a)
P
Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2
(q1, q2) q2 = (1, 0) q2 = (0, 1) P
Q
(2)
1
(q1)
q1 = (0, 0) 0 1− p 1− p
q1 = (1, 1) p 0 p
P
Q
(2)
2
(q2) p 1− p
(b)
Since a PIR scheme is also an IR scheme, this simple
approach for the construction of WPIR schemes can also be
adapted to use any of the existing (M/η, n) PIR schemes in the
literature as a subscheme. We refer to the partition scheme that
uses a PIR scheme as the underlying subscheme and the query
generation in (7) as a basic scheme and denote it by C basic
(it gives the 4-tuple as in (8) with ρ˜(·) = 0). In Section IV-B,
we will present another partition WPIR scheme based on our
proposed IR scheme.
IV. (M, n) SCHEME 1
In [21, Sec. III-B], a PIR scheme that achieves both the min-
imum upload and download cost was proposed. The queries
Q[n] of the scheme in [21, Sec. III-B] are randomly generated
according to a random strategy S = (S1, . . . , SM−1) with
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) entries accord-
ing to U([0 : n− 1]).2 In this section, we introduce an (M, n)
WPIR scheme, referred to as Scheme 1 and denoted by C1,
based on the PIR scheme in [21]. Scheme 1 can be seen as
a generalization of the PIR scheme in [21] where we lift the
perfect privacy condition (3).
For the proposed scheme, assume that X = {0, 1} and the
file size to be β = n − 1. We represent a query by a length-
M vector ql = (ql,1, . . . , ql,M) ∈ Ql ⊆ [0 : n − 1]M. Also,
the realization of S is denoted by a length-(M − 1) vector
s = (s1, . . . , sM−1), sj ∈ [0 : n− 1], j ∈ [M− 1].
Before describing Scheme 1 in detail for the general case,
for simplicity we first present Scheme 1 for the case of M = 2
files and n = 2 servers (i.e., both servers 1 and 2 store X(1),
X(2)) in the following example.
Example 1. We illustrate the (2, 2) Scheme 1 obtained by
adopting a nonuniformly-distributed random strategy S giving
a joint PMF PQ1,Q2(q1, q2) as in Table I. Files X
(1) and
X(2) are composed of one stripe each (β = n − 1 = 1).
The answers A1 and A2 are given by
(
A1(q1),A2(q2)
)
=
2The PIR scheme in [21, Sec. III-B] can be seen as a generalization of the
canonical (2, 2) PIR scheme that was first introduced in [45, Sec. III-B] and
further elaborated in [46], where the authors focused on the minimization of
the storage overhead.
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Fig. 1. The IR rate R(C1) ∈
[
2
3
, 1
]
of the proposed (2, 2) Scheme 1, as a
function of ρ(·). The triangle marks the 2-server PIR capacity for M = 2.(
X
(1)
q1,1 +X
(2)
q1,2 , X
(1)
q2,1 +X
(2)
q2,2
)
, where X(m)0 = 0 for all m ∈
[2].
One can easily verify that perfect retrievability is satisfied
for the above (2, 2) IR scheme. Its IR rate is a function of p
and is given by R(p) = (p + (1 − p) + p)−1 = (1 + p)−1.
Observe that M ⊥ Q1, which implies that I(M ;Q1) =
WIL(M ;Q1) = MaxL(M ;Q1) = 0, i.e., it does not leak
any information on the identity of the retrieved file to the first
server.
The information leakage is ρ(MI) = 1−Hb(p)2 , ρ
(WIL) =
1 − Hb(p), and ρ(MaxL) = log2 [2(1− p)] for 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 ,
where Hb(p) , −p log2 p− (1− p) log2 (1− p) is the binary
entropy function. From this derivation, it follows that the (2, 2)
Scheme 1 achieves perfect privacy for p = 12 . The IR rate of
the (2, 2) Scheme 1, R(C1), is depicted in Fig. 1 as a function
of the information leakage ρ(·). Interestingly, by sacrificing
perfect privacy, it is possible to achieve an IR rate larger
than the 2-server PIR capacity for 2 files. As expected, the IR
rate increases with increasing information leakage.
Now, we describe Scheme 1 for the general case of M files
and n servers. We assume that the user wants to download
file X(m) and has a random strategy S that takes on values
s ∈ [0 : n− 1]M−1 with PMF PS(s).
1) Query Generation: The query ql ∈ Ql, l ∈ [n], sent to
the l-th server, resulting from the query-encoding function φl,
is defined as
ql =
(
s1, . . . , sm−1, ql,m, sm, . . . , sM−1
)
, (10)
where ql,m ,
(
l − 1−∑j∈[M−1] sj) mod n. It follows that
Ql =
ql :
( ∑
m′∈[M]
ql,m′
)
mod n = l − 1
. (11)
Note that the PMF of Ql conditioned on the file index M
satisfies P
Q
(m)
l
(ql) = PS(s).
2) Answer Construction: The answer function ϕl maps the
query ql into
Al = ϕl(ql,X
[M]) = X(1)ql,1 + · · ·+X(M)ql,M , (12)
where X(m
′)
0 = 0 for all m
′ ∈ [M]. Further, we see that the
answer-length functions satisfy
`l(Ql) =
{
0 if ql = 0,
1 otherwise.
(13)
This completes the construction of the (M, n) Scheme 1.
Note that it follows from (12) that A = {0, 1} = X . The
perfect retrievability of Scheme 1 can be verified by following
the same argument as in [21, Sec. III-B]. Moreover, using (13),
the IR rate of the (M, n) Scheme 1, C1, can be shown to be
R(C1) =
n− 1
1− PQ1(0) + n− 1
. (14)
We also remark that if Scheme 1 uses a random strategy S with
{Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d. according to U([0 : n− 1]), then it satisfies
(3) and is equivalent to the PIR capacity-achieving scheme
proposed in [21].
For completeness, we prove that Scheme 1 ensures perfect
retrievability in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding servers
storing M files. Then, the queries Ql and answers Al, l ∈ [n],
designed as in (10) and (12), satisfy the recovery condition
in (1).
Proof: Given S = s = (s1, . . . , sM−1) ∈ [0 : n− 1]M−1
and M = m, the answer from the l-th server can be re-written
as
Al = X
(m)
ql,m
+
(
m−1∑
m′=1
X(m
′)
sm′ +
M∑
m′=m+1
X(m
′)
sm′−1
)
,
, X(m)ql,m + Z, l ∈ [n].
Since by definition ql,m =
(
l − 1 −∑M−1j=1 sj) mod n, ql,m
must range thoroughly from 0 and n − 1, and for l′ − 1 =(∑M−1
j=1 sj
)
mod n, we have Al′ = X
(m)
ql′,m + Z = 0 + Z.
Thus, the user can obtain X(m)ql,m = Al − Z, and retrieve
{X(m)1 , . . . , X(m)n−1}.
The following corollary follows immediately from the con-
struction of Scheme 1.
Corollary 1. Let {Sj}M−1j=1 be i.i.d. and Sj ∼ U([0 : n− 1])
for Scheme 1. Then, it satisfies (3) and is equivalent to the
PIR capacity-achieving scheme proposed in [21].
Proof: Observe that if {Sj}M−1j=1 are i.i.d. according
to U([0 : n− 1]), then for every m,m′ ∈ [M] with m 6= m′,
it holds that
Pr[Ql = ql |M = m] = Pr[Ql = ql |M = m′] =
( 1
n
)M−1
for all ql ∈ Ql, l ∈ [n]. Moreover, from the answer
construction of (12), the IR rate is
R =
β log2 2
log2 2
∑n
l=1 EQl [`l(Ql)]
7=
n− 1[
1− PQ1(0)
]
+
∑n
l=2 EQl [`l(Ql)]
=
n− 1(
1− 1
nM−1
)
+ (n− 1) =
1− 1n
1− 1
nM
,
which is equal to the n-server PIR capacity for M files.
A. (M, 2) Scheme 1 With {Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d. According to
Bernoulli(p)
The following result gives an achievable 4-tuple for
Scheme 1 for the case of two servers and a random strat-
egy S = (S1, . . . , SM−1) with i.i.d. entries according to
Bernoulli(p).
Theorem 3. Consider 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2. Then, the 4-tuple
(R1,U1,∆1, ρ
(·)
1
)
,
R1 =
(
1− (1− p)M−1 + 1)−1,
U1 = −
M∑
w=0
(
M
w
)
f(w, p) log2 f(w, p),
∆1 =
M∑
w=0
w
(
M
w
)
f(w, p),
ρ
(MI)
1 = U1/2− (M− 1)Hb(p),
ρ
(WIL)
1 = log2M−minw∈[0:M] H(Mw), and
ρ
(MaxL)
1 = log2
∑
w∈[M]
w : odd
(
M
w
)
(1− p)M−wpw−1
is achievable by the (M, 2) Scheme 1 with {Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d.
according to Bernoulli(p), where
f(w, p) , 1
M
(
(M− w)(1− p)M−w−1pw + w(1− p)M−wpw−1)
and Mw is a RV with PMF
PMw(m
′) =

(1−p)M−w−1pw
Mf(w,p) if m
′ ∈ [M− w],
(1−p)M−wpw−1
Mf(w,p) if m
′ ∈ [M− w + 1 : M].
(15)
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Partition Scheme 1: Using Scheme 1 as a Subscheme
In Section III, we introduced the concept of adopting an
existing (M/η, n) IR scheme to retrieve a file from a given
partition. In this section, unlike (7), where the user sends dif-
ferent queries for different requested files among all partitions,
we use a slightly more sophisticated way to construct a WPIR
scheme by using Scheme 1 as a subscheme for every partition.
We refer to this scheme as partition Scheme 1 and denote it
by C part1 . In the following, we present the query generation
and the answer construction.
1) Query Generation: We consider the j-th partition, Pj ,
j ∈ [η], containing all files of indices (j−1)M/η+1, . . . , jM/η.
Given a requested file with index m = (j−1)M/η+m′ ∈ Pj ,
m′ ∈ [M/η], we consider an (M/η, n) Scheme 1 as a subscheme
for partition Pj . The l-th query ql ∈ Ql, l ∈ [n], is defined as
ql =
(
01×(j−1)M/η, s1, . . . , sm′−1, ql,(j−1)M/η+m′ ,
sm′ , . . . , sM/η−1,01×(η−j)M/η
)
,
where ql,(j−1)M/η+m′ =
(
l − 1−∑j∈[M/η−1] sj) mod n. We
remark that it is possible that the user sends the all-zero query
ql = 0 to request different files among all partitions. In this
way, since the uncertainty on the requested file is increased,
it follows that the leakage of C part1 is slightly smaller than the
leakage of the basic scheme. Moreover, the query alphabet size
is not exactly the same for all servers, i.e., we have |Q1| =
1 + η
(
nM/η−1 − 1) and |Ql| = η · nM/η−1 for l ∈ [2 : n].
2) Answer Construction: Similar to Scheme 1, the answer
function ϕl maps query ql into Al = ϕ(ql,X [M]) = X
(1)
ql,1 +
· · ·+X(M)ql,M , where X(m
′)
0 = 0 for all m
′ ∈ [M]. Further, we
see that `l(Ql) satisfies (13).
C. (M, n) Partition Scheme 1 With {Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. Accord-
ing to U([0 : n− 1])
We focus on a particular (M, n) partition Scheme 1. Since
the servers can learn some information from which partition
the requested file belongs to, in order to have a relatively
small leakage of partition Scheme 1, it is reasonable to use
Scheme 1 with {Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. according to U([0 : n− 1])
as a subscheme (i.e., a PIR subscheme, cf. Corollary 1). Thus,
this scheme works for any arbitrary number of servers n. We
have the following result.
Theorem 4. Let M/η be a positive integer with η ∈ [M− 1].
Then, the 4-tuple
(
R1,P,U1,P,∆1,P, ρ
(·)
1,P
)
,
R1,P =
(
1 +
1
n
+ · · ·+ 1
nM/η−1
)−1
,
U1,P = n
[
(M/η − 1) log2 n+ log2 η
]− log2 η
nM/η−1
,
∆1,P = (n− 1)M/η,
ρ
(MI)
1,P = log2 η −
log2 η
nM/η
, and
ρ
(WIL)
1,P = log2 η = ρ
(MaxL)
1,P ,
is achievable by the (M, n) partition Scheme 1 using
the (M/η, n) Scheme 1 with {Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. according to
U([0 : n− 1]) as a subscheme.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Let
(
R˜, U˜, ∆˜, 0
)
be the achievable 4-tuple of the (M/η, 2)
Scheme 1 with {Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. according to U([0 : n− 1]). It
follows that U1,P = U˜+ 2 log2 η − log2 η/nM/η−1 < U(C basic)
and ρ(MI)1,P = log2 η − log2 η/nM/η < ρ(MI)(C basic), while R1,P,
∆1,P, ρ
(WIL)
1,P , and ρ
(MaxL)
1,P are identical to those of the basic
scheme C basic in Section III (see the details in Appendix B).
Hence, in the numerical results section, the results of C basic
are not presented.
8V. CONSTANT-RATE (M, n) SCHEME 2
We propose an alternative WPIR scheme, referred to as
Scheme 2 and denoted by C2, based on the PIR scheme in
[13, Lem. 4]. Scheme 2 is constructed as follows. Assume that
β = n− 1 and that the user requests file X(m). The random
strategy S takes the form of a vector S = (S1, . . . , SβM) ∈
X βM of length βM. The query vector Ql ∈ Ql = X βM, of
length βM, is obtained as Ql = φ(m,S) = S+vl, where the
vector vl is deterministic and is completely determined by m.
We refer the reader to [13, Sec. V] for details on the design of
vl. The l-th server responds to its corresponding query with
the answer Al ∈ A = X obtained as Al = ϕ(Ql,X [M]) =
〈Ql, (X(1)1 , . . . , X(1)β , . . . , X(M)β )〉.
For the case where {Sj}βMj=1 are i.i.d. according to U(X ),
Scheme 2 achieves perfect privacy, and the scheme reduces
to the PIR scheme in [13, Lem. 4]. Furthermore, similar
to [13, Thm. 2], it can be shown that the scheme achieves
perfect retrievability (see (1)), and since its answer-lengths
are constant for all possible queries of each server, the IR rate
R2 of C2 is equal to 1 − 1/n, irrespective of the information
leakage ρ(·).
A. (M, 2) Scheme 2 With {Sj}Mj=1 i.i.d. According to
Bernoulli(p)
Consider the binary field. We have the following result.
Theorem 5. Consider 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2. Then, the 4-tuple(
1/2,U2,∆2, ρ
(·)
2
)
,
U2 = −
M∑
w=0
(
M
w
)
g(w, p) log2 g(w, p) +MHb(p),
∆2 =
M∑
w=0
w
(
M
w
)(
g(w, p) + h(w, p)
)
,
ρ
(MI)
2 = U2/2−MHb(p),
ρ
(WIL)
2 = log2M− min
w∈[0:M]
H(M ′w), and
ρ
(MaxL)
2 = log2
(
(1− p)M−1p
+
∑
w∈[1:M]
(
M
w
)
(1− p)M−(w−1)pw−1
)
is achievable by the (M, 2) Scheme 2 with
{Sj}Mj=1 i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(p), where
g(w, p) ,
[
(M−w)(1−p)M−w−1pw+1+w(1−p)M−w+1pw−1
]
/M,
h(w, p) , (1− p)M−wpw, and M ′w is a RV with PMF
PM ′w(m
′) =

(1−p)M−w−1pw+1
Mg(w,p) if m
′ ∈ [M− w],
(1−p)M−w+1pw−1
Mg(w,p) if m
′ ∈ [M− w + 1 : M].
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3,
and is omitted for brevity.
In the following subsection, we analyze the (M, 2)
Scheme 2 with a uniformly-distributed random strategy S.
Note that similarly to partition Scheme 1 in Section IV-C, we
can also construct a partition scheme by using Scheme 2 as a
subscheme for every partition. We omit the analysis since it is
almost the same as for partition Scheme 1, and the result for
the (M, n) partition Scheme 2 with {Sj}M/ηj=1 i.i.d. according
to U([0 : n− 1]) is very close to the result in Theorem 4.
B. (M, 2) Scheme 2 With S Uniformly Distributed
We consider the (M, 2) Scheme 2 with S uniformly
distributed over all length-M binary vectors of weight w.
In other words, S ∼ U(Bw,M), where Bw,M ,
{
s ∈
{0, 1}M : wH(s) = w
}
.
Theorem 6. Given any w ∈ [0 : M]. Then, the 4-tuple(
1/2,U2,U,∆2,U, ρ
(·)
2,U
)
,
U2,U = log2
(
M
w
)
+ y(w,M),
∆2,U = 1 + 2w(1− 1/M),
ρ
(MI)
2,U =
y(w,M)− log2
(
M
w
)
2
,
ρ
(WIL)
2,U = log2M
− min{log2 (w + 1), log2 (M− w + 1)}, and
ρ
(MaxL)
2,U = log2
(
M− w
w + 1
+
w
M− w + 1
)
is achievable by the (M, 2) Scheme 2 with S ∼ U(Bw,M),
where y(w,M) , log2
(
M
w
)
+ log2M− (M−w) log2 (w+1)/M−
w log2 (M−w+1)/M.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We remark that the analysis of the (M, 2) Scheme 1 with
S ∼ U(Bw,M−1) can also be done by following the same
approach as for Theorem 6.3 However, since the resulting
performance is much worse than those of the aforementioned
WPIR schemes for the case of n = 2 servers, we omit the
detailed analysis in this paper.
In the rest of the paper, except for the numerical results
in Section IX, we consider only the MI and MaxL privacy
metrics as these are more commonly used [32].
VI. MINIMIZATION OF THE INFORMATION LEAKAGE FOR
SCHEME 1 WITH TIME-SHARING
A main objective of this work is to determine the optimal
WPIR scheme that leaks the smallest amount of information,
subject to a given IR download cost, upload cost, or access
complexity. Since both the information leakage and the IR
rate can be improved based on the query generation of
Scheme 1, our aim is to study the optimal tradeoff between
the information leakage and the download cost for Scheme 1.
In the rest of paper, we will mainly focus on the MI and MaxL
privacy metrics.
Following the notion of Theorem 1 for the MI metric, we
can use the time-sharing principle to construct a time-sharing
scheme from Scheme 1, referred to as time-sharing Scheme 1
3The scheme is not equal to that of [21] because of the difference in the
vector space of the random strategy. The former involves all length-(M− 1)
vectors of weight w, while the latter consists of all vectors of length M− 1.
9and denoted by C 1.4 Recall that in Scheme 1 the query
realization ql of the l-th server, l ∈ [n], belongs to Ql, defined
in (11), from which it follows that all of the query sets Ql
are distinct. The conditional query PMF P
Q
(m)
l
(ql) = PS(s)
is independent of M = m, and the download cost of the
(M, n) Scheme 1 is 1 − PS(0) + (n − 1) (cf. Section IV).
Denote by zs , PS(s) the PMF of the random strategy S,
and ql\{m} , (ql,1, . . . , ql,m−1, ql,m+1, . . . , ql,M), m ∈ [M].
By applying the time-sharing approach, the resulting query set
at the l-th server is Ql = [0 : n − 1]M, and the conditional
PMF of Ql given M = m is
P
Q
(m)
l
(q¯l) =
n∑
t=1
Pr[T = t] Pr
[
Q
(m)
σt−1(l) = q¯l
∣∣∣T = t]
=
1
n
zs, for s = q¯l \ {m}, q¯l ∈ Ql, (16)
where (16) follows since all query sets in Scheme 1 are
different. In other words, by using the time-sharing approach,
we obtain a new scheme with a conditional query distribution
at each server equal to(P
Q
(m)
σ0(l)
(·)
n
, · · · ,
P
Q
(m)
σn−1(l)
(·)
n
)
, (17)
where P
Q
(m)
l
(·) = (p1, . . . , p|Ql|) represents the conditional
query distribution corresponding to PQl|M=m for Scheme 1.
Therefore, from (16) or (17) it follows that every server has
identical information leakage for the time-sharing Scheme 1
under both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics. Note that the
download cost stays the same as for Scheme 1.
For the time-sharing Scheme 1, the minimization of the
information leakage ρ(·)(C 1) under a download cost constraint
D can be casted as the optimization problem
minimize ρ(·)(C 1) (18a)
subject to 1− z0 + (n− 1) ≤ D, (18b)∑
s∈[0:n−1]M−1
zs = 1. (18c)
A. Optimizing the MI Leakage
In terms of the MI privacy metric, we know from Theorem 1
that the leakage of C 1 is equal to5
ρ(MI)(C 1) = I(M ;Ql)
=
1
n
∑
l′∈[n]
[
H(Ql′)− H(Ql′ |M)
]
=
1
n
∑
l′∈[n]
H(PQl′ )− H
(
(z)s∈[0:n−1]M−1
)
(a)
=
1
n
∑
q¯l∈[0:n−1]M
−
M∑
m=1
PS(q¯l\{m})
M
 log2

M∑
m=1
PS(q¯l\{m})
M

4The time-sharing principle can be applied to any WPIR scheme. However,
here we concentrate only on the time-sharing Scheme 1.
5Note that the MI leakage of Scheme 1 and that of the corresponding time-
sharing Scheme 1 is always the same due to the definition of MI leakage in
(4).
−H((z)s∈[0:n−1]M−1)
=
1
n
∑
q¯1∈[0:n−1]M
(
−
M∑
m=1
zq¯1\{m}
M
)
log2
( M∑
m=1
zq¯1\{m}
M
)
− H((z)s∈[0:n−1]M−1). (19)
where (a) holds by the definition of entropy and the fact that⋃n
l=1Ql = Q1 = [0 : n− 1]M. Hence, (18a) becomes (19).
We remark that the MI objective function I
(
M ;Q1
)
is
convex in PQ1|M , and PQ1|M is subject to the following linear
constraints
PQ1|M (q¯1|m) = PQ1|M (q¯′1|m), ∀ q¯1 \ {m} = q¯′1 \ {m}.
Thus, the optimization problem (18) under MI leakage is
convex. However, it is difficult to have closed-form optimal so-
lutions for (M, n) 6= (2, 2), and hence instead we present nu-
merical results of the optimized time-sharing (M, 2) Scheme 1
for several values of the number of files M in Section IX.
Lastly, we would like to emphasize that for any information
leakage metric ρ(·) that is convex in PQ1|M we end up with
a convex optimization problem for the maximization of the
download rate of the time-sharing Scheme 1.
B. Optimizing the MaxL
In this subsection, we turn our attention to the minimization
of the MaxL for the proposed (M, n) Scheme 1 with time-
sharing. Similar to the derivation for the MI metric, by
definition (18a) becomes
ρ(MaxL)(C 1) = log2
∑
q¯l∈Ql
max
m∈[M]
zq¯l\{m}
n
.
We remark that as for MI leakage, the time-sharing
Scheme 1 C 1 also has identical MaxL at each server. Using
again the fact that the sets Ql are distinct and
⋃n
l=1Ql = Ql,
we have
ρ(MaxL)(C1) = max
l∈[n]
{
log2
∑
ql∈Ql
max
m∈[M]
PQl|M (ql|m)
}
= log2
{
max
l∈[n]
∑
ql∈Ql
max
m∈[M]
PQl|M (ql|m)
}
≥ log2
{
1
n
∑
l∈[n]
∑
ql∈Ql
max
m∈[M]
PQl|M (ql|m)
}
= ρ(MaxL)(C 1).
From Lemma 1 and using a similar argument as in Sec-
tion VI-A, replacing the objective function with 2ρ
(MaxL)(C 1)
in (18) gives a convex minimization problem. In Section IX
below, we give numerical optimal values for (18) under MaxL
and compare them with the converse results presented next.
VII. CONVERSE RESULTS FOR MI LEAKAGE
In order to present the converse results of WPIR for the MI
metric, we first introduce the following measure between two
PMFs.
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Definition 3. The TV distance between two PMFs PY1 and
PY2 on the same finite alphabet Y is defined as
‖PY1 − PY2‖TV , maxZ⊆Y |PY1(Z)− PY2(Z)|,
where PY (Z) ,
∑
z∈Z PY (z) is the probability of all real-
izations in the set Z .
Next, we review a useful lemma related to the TV, which
was presented in [47, Lem. 2].
Lemma 3. If I(X ;Y ) ≤ ρ, then for any x, x′ ∈ X , we have∥∥PY |X=x − PY |X=x′∥∥TV ≤ 1− 2H−1b (1− ρ) , δMI.
Here, since we require that δMI ≥ 0, it is easy to see that
we can specify H−1b (1− ρ) ∈
[
0, 12
]
.
Lastly, we consider a known result between the entropy
difference and the TV, which can be derived by using a
probabilistic coupling technique.
Lemma 4 ([48, Eq. (4)]). If
∥∥PY |X=x − PY |X=x′∥∥TV ≤ δMI,
then∣∣H(PY |X=x)− H(PY |X=x′)∣∣ ≤ δMI log2(|Y| − 1) + 1. (20)
Note that if we replace the 1 in the right-hand side of the
inequality (20) with Hb(δMI), the upper bound becomes tight
for 0 < δMI ≤ 1− 1/|Y| [49, Thm. 6].6
We remark that under the MI metric, we measure the overall
leakage of a WPIR scheme in an average manner, i.e., ρ(MI) =
1
n
∑
l∈[n] I(M ;Ql). Here, given a leakage constraint ρ
(MI) ≤
ρ, we assume that I(M ;Ql) = ρl, ∀ l ∈ [n].
Let us define
MI(Ql,A) , δMIl log2(|Ql ×A| − 1) + 1,
MI(Ql) , δMIl log2(|Ql| − 1) + 1,
where δMIl = 1−2H−1b (1−ρl), l ∈ [n]. We give the following
useful lemma.
Lemma 5. Given m 6= m′, where m,m′ /∈M ( [M−1], we
have
H(A
(m)
[n] |Q(m)[n] ,XM)
≥ β log2 |X |+
H
(
A
(m′)
[n]
∣∣Q(m′)[n] ,XM,X(m))
n
−
∑n
l=1
[
MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)
]
n
. (21)
Moreover,
H(A
(M)
[n] |Q(M)[n] ,X [M−1]) ≥ β log2 |X |. (22)
Proof: The proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Now, we are ready to derive a general lower bound on D.
Since H(A(m)l |Q(m)l = ql) ≤ log2
∣∣A∣∣`l(ql) for a given ql ∈
Ql, we have
D(m) = log2|A|
n∑
l=1
∑
ql∈Ql
P
Q
(m)
l
(ql)`l(ql)
6The results shown in [48] and [49] assume the variational distance as the
measure between two PMFs. It can be easily shown that the TV distance
is equal to the variational distance divided by 2, i.e.,
∥∥PY1 − PY2∥∥TV =
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∣∣PY1 (y)− PY2 (y)∣∣, see, e.g., [50, Lem. 3.11].
≥
n∑
l=1
∑
ql∈Ql
P
Q
(m)
l
(ql)H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)l = ql)
=
n∑
l=1
H(A
(m)
l |Q(m)l ).
Note that without loss of generality, we can assume that
the conditional entropies H(A(m)[n] |Q(m)[n] ), m ∈ [M], satisfy
H(A
(1)
[n] |Q(1)[n] ) ≤ · · · ≤ H(A(M)[n] |Q(M)[n] ).
Hence, the total download cost can be bounded from below
by
D(C )
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
D(m) ≥ 1
M
M∑
m=1
n∑
l=1
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)l )
(a)
≥ 1
M
M∑
m=1
H(A
(m)
[n] |Q(m)[n] )
≥ 1
M
M∑
m=1
H(A
(1)
[n] |Q(1)[n] ) = H(A(1)[n] |Q(1)[n] )
(b)
≥ β log2 |X |+
H
(
A
(2)
[n]
∣∣Q(2)[n] ,X(1))
n
−
∑n
l=1
[
MI(A,Ql) + MI(Ql)
]
n
...
(c)
≥ β log2 |X |+
M−1∑
m=1
[
β log2 |X |
nm
−
∑n
l=1
[
MI(A,Ql) + MI(Ql)
]
nm
]
, (23)
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, and
(b)–(c) follow by recursively applying Lemma 5 M times with
M = ∅, {1}, . . . , [M− 1], respectively.
A. A Converse Bound With Restricted Alphabets of Queries
and Download Symbols
The expression in (23) indicates that a general lower bound
on D can be arbitrarily dependent on the choice of the alpha-
bets of the queries and download symbols. In this subsection, a
converse bound for WPIR schemes is derived from a practical
design perspective. We assume that
|Ql| ≤ α <∞, (24a)
|A| ≤ |X |β , (24b)
∀ l ∈ [n], for some positive α ∈ N, i.e., the query sizes are
finite and the downloaded symbols (per server) take value on
a smaller alphabet than that of the retrieved file.
We first state the following theorem, which gives an upper
bound on the maximum possible WPIR rate for the MI metric.
Theorem 7. Consider an (M, n) WPIR scheme that satis-
fies (24) and with MI leakage ρ(MI) ≤ ρ. Then, the maximum
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possible WPIR rate, denoted by R(MI)max , is bounded from above
by
R(MI)max ≤
[
1
nM−1
+ 2
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm−1
H−1b (1− ρ)
]−1
, R(MI)UB .
Proof: Under these assumptions, (23) becomes
D(C )
≥ β log2 |X |+
M−1∑
m=1
[
β log2 |X |
nm
−
n∑
l=1
(
δMIl log2 (α|X |β)
nm
+
δMIl log2 α
nm
+
2
nm
)]
. (25)
Dividing (25) by β log2 |X | gives
D(C )
β log2 |X |
≥ 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
[
1
nm
−
n∑
l=1
(
δMIl log2 α
nmβ log2 |X |
+
δMIl
nm
+
δMIl log2 α
nmβ log2 |X |
+
2
nmβ log2 |X |
)]
β→∞−−−−→ 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
∑n
l=1 δ
MI
l
nm
, (26)
= 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
∑n
l=1
[
1− 2H−1b (1− ρl)
]
nm
= 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
n
nm
+ 2
M−1∑
m=1
n∑
l=1
H−1b (1− ρl)
nm
(a)
≥ 1
nM−1
+ 2
M−1∑
m=1
n
nm
H−1b
(
1− 1
n
n∑
l=1
ρl
)
(b)
≥ 1
nM−1
+ 2
M−1∑
m=1
n
nm
H−1b (1− ρ)
=
1
nM−1
+ 2
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm−1
H−1b (1− ρ),
where (a) and (b) hold because the inverse binary entropy
function is convex and increasing in [0, 1], respectively.
In the following, we prove the largest possible achievable
WPIR rate for the special case of (M, n) = (2, 2) under the
additional constraint that only one of the two servers can leak.
Theorem 8. Consider an (M, n) = (2, 2) WPIR scheme that
satisfies (24) and with MI leakage ρ(MI) ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Then, the
maximum possible WPIR rate is
R(MI)max =
[
1 + H−1b (1− 2ρ)
]−1
under the assumption that only one of the two servers can
leak.
Proof: The achievable scheme is the Scheme 1 presented
in Example 1. Thus, we only need to prove the converse.
Assume without loss of generality that I(M ;Q1) = ρ1 = 0
and I(M ;Q2) = ρ2 = 2ρ. By definition, δMI1 = 1−2H−1b (1−
ρ1) = 0 and we can use the exact same derivation as in
Section VII-A to obtain from (26)
D(C )
β log2 |X |
≥ 1 + 1
2
− δ
MI
2
2
=
3
2
− 1− 2H
−1
b (1− 2ρ)
2
= 1 + H−1b (1− 2ρ),
as β →∞, which completes the proof.
VIII. CONVERSE RESULTS FOR MAXL
In this section, we present the converse results for the MaxL
metric. Similar to the case of the MI privacy metric, we make
use of the following lemma.
Theorem 9. Consider an (M, n) WPIR scheme that satis-
fies (24) and with MaxL ρ(MaxL) ≤ ρ. Then, the maximum
possible WPIR rate, denoted by R(MaxL)max , is bounded from
above by
R(MaxL)max ≤
[
1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
2ρ − 1
nm−1
]−1
, R(MaxL)UB .
Proof: Similar to the case with the MI privacy metric, we
first make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 6. If MaxL(X ;Y ) ≤ ρ, then for any x, x′ ∈ X , we
have ∥∥PY |X=x − PY |X=x′∥∥TV ≤ 2ρ − 1 , δMaxL.
Lemma 6 can be proven by a similar argument as in
[47, Appendix C]. The proof is provided in Appendix E for
completeness.
Note that for the MaxL metric, we consider the worst-case
MaxL over all servers, i.e., ρ(MaxL) = maxl∈[n] MaxL(M ;Ql).
If the leakage at the l-th server is MaxL(M ;Ql) ≤ ρl, then
we have ρ(MaxL) ≤ maxl∈[n] ρl , ρ. A lower bound on the
download cost can be proven by following the same steps as
in Section VII. Under the assumptions in (24), and as β →∞,
(26) becomes
D(C )
β log2 |X |
≥ 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
∑n
l=1 δ
MaxL
l
nm
.
≥ 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
nmaxl∈[n] δMaxLl
nm
= 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
maxl∈[n] δMaxLl
nm−1
= 1 +
M−1∑
m=1
1
nm
−
M−1∑
m=1
2ρ − 1
nm−1
, (27)
where (27) follows from Lemma 6 and maxl∈[n] δMaxLl =
2maxl∈[n] ρl − 1 = 2ρ − 1.
In the following theorem we give the maximum achievable
WPIR rate under the MaxL metric for the special case of
(M, n) = (2, 2).
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Theorem 10. Consider an (M, n) = (2, 2) WPIR scheme
that satisfies (24) and with MaxL ρ(MaxL) ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Then, the
maximum possible WPIR rate is
R(MaxL)max (ρ) =
[
5
2
+ 2ρ
]−1
.
Moreover, assuming that only one of the two servers can leak
information, then the maximum possible WPIR rate is
R(MaxL)max (ρ) =
[
1 + 2ρ−1
]−1
.
Proof: The achievable scheme for the first assertion is
Scheme 1 with time-sharing. In particular, by applying the
time-sharing principle to Example 1, we get the following
conditional PMF of Q1 given M = m,
PQ¯1|M (q¯1|m) m = 1 m = 2
q¯1 = (0, 0)
1− p
2
1− p
2
q¯1 = (0, 1)
p
2
1− p
2
q¯1 = (1, 0)
1− p
2
p
2
q¯1 = (1, 1)
p
2
p
2
Thus, by definitions we get 2ρ
(MaxL)
= 1/2 + (1 − p), for 0 ≤
p ≤ 1/2, and hence it can be seen that D = 1 + p = 1 + 3/2−
2ρ
(MaxL)
= 5/2 − 2ρ(MaxL) . Note that this is also the optimized
time-sharing Scheme 1 under the MaxL metric for (M, n) =
(2, 2), where the optimal solution for (18) is (z∗0 , z
∗
1) = (2−
D,D− 1). The converse part is proven by (27), which gives
D(C )
β log2 |X |
≥ 1 + 1
2
− 2
ρ − 1
1
=
5
2
− 2ρ
for (M, n) = (2, 2).
Further, the second assertion can be proven by following
the same lines as in the poof of Theorem 8.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section consists of two subsections. Section IX-A con-
siders the case of two servers and compares the achievable 4-
tuples
(
R,U,∆, ρ(·)
)
for the (M, 2) WPIR schemes proposed
in Sections IV-A, IV-C, V-A, and V-B. Section IX-B presents
optimized values for the download rate for the time-sharing
Scheme 1 by numerically solving the convex optimization
problem in (18) for both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics
and comparisons with the converse bounds from Theorems 7
and 9.
A. (M, 2) WPIR Schemes
Four (M, 2) WPIR schemes presented in Sections IV-A,
IV-C, V-A, and V-B are illustrated. For the sake of illustration,
the information leakage ρ(MI) is normalized by log2M bits,
while the upload cost and access complexity are normalized
by 2(M − 1) and M, respectively. 2(M − 1) and M are
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Fig. 2. R, U, and ∆ of different WPIR schemes for M = 32, as a function
of ρ(MI). For M = 32, CM,2 is almost equal to 1/2.
the upload cost and access complexity of the PIR capacity-
achieving scheme presented in [21] for the case of two servers.
The upload cost 2(M − 1) is optimal among all so-called
decomposable PIR capacity-achieving schemes [21].7
Fig. 2 presents the results of the four WPIR schemes for the
case of M = 32 files and leakage metric ρ(MI). We can see that
Scheme 1 yields the best performance in terms of download
rate, upload cost, and access complexity for a given leakage
constraint for all leakage metrics. Note that the IR rate of
Scheme 2 with different S is always equal to 1/2. The results
of the four WPIR schemes for WIL and MaxL are provided
in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. For WIL, Scheme 1 performs
best among the four schemes for all values of the information
leakage in terms of download rate, upload cost, and access
complexity. However, for MaxL the partition Scheme 1 (from
Theorem 4) has a comparable performance to Scheme 1 with
{Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(p) (from Theorem 3)
for both download rate and access complexity. In particular,
for ρ(MaxL) = 0.8 it exhibits a slightly higher download rate,
whereas for 0.2 ≤ ρ(MaxL) ≤ 0.8 it achieves a lower access
complexity. On the other hand, it yields a significantly lower
upload cost for all values of the information leakage.
7Based on [21, Def. 2], all existing PIR schemes in the literature are
decomposable.
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Fig. 3. R, U, and ∆ of different WPIR schemes for M = 32, as a function
of ρ(WIL). Here, R2 = 1/2 is not plotted.
B. Optimized Rates for the Time-Sharing Scheme 1
In this subsection, we give the maximum download rate
under a leakage constraint for the time-sharing Scheme 1
described in Section VI with both the MI and MaxL privacy
metrics. Since for both metrics optimizing the download rate
is a convex problem (see (18)), the optimal solutions can be
obtained by using the CVXPY Python-embedded modeling
language for convex optimization problems [51], [52]. The
optimal corresponding rate obtained from (18) is denoted by
R¯
(·)
opt. Unless specified otherwise, all solutions are numeri-
cally computed. Moreover, if the converse bound R(·)UB (see
Theorems 7 and 9) is trivial for all leakage constraints, i.e.,
R
(·)
UB ≥ 1, we do not include it in the figures.
Under the MI privacy metric, Fig. 5 compares the optimal
rate-leakage tradeoff curve for the canonical case of (M, n) =
(2, 2) to the converse bound R(MI)UB from Theorem 7, which
shows that in general it is not tight. We remark that the optimal
curve is equal to the curve presented in Example 1, and it
can also be shown that the analytical optimal solution can be
derived directly from (18). In Fig. 6, for (M, n) = (6, 2), the
download rate from Theorems 3 and 4 is plotted as a function
of the information leakage, together with the optimal download
rate R¯(MI)opt for the time-sharing Scheme 1 obtained from (18).
The comparisons show that Scheme 1 with {Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d. ac-
cording to Bernoulli(p) (from Theorem 3) exhibits a download
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Fig. 4. R, U, and ∆ of different WPIR schemes for M = 32, as a function
of ρ(MaxL).
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Fig. 5. The optimized rate R¯(MI)opt for the time-sharing Scheme 1 and R
(MI)
UB
for (M, n) = (2, 2), as a function of ρ(MI).
rate that is close to being optimal. On the other hand, partition
Scheme 1 (from Theorem 4) performs quite far from the
optimal tradeoff curve. In Fig. 7, the corresponding curves for
(M, n) = (6, 3) (excluding the curve from Theorem 3, which
assumes n = 2) are presented. Again, partition Scheme 1
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Fig. 6. The optimized rate R¯(MI)opt , R1, and R1,P for (M, n) = (6, 2), as a
function of ρ(MI).
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Fig. 7. The optimized rate R¯(MI)opt and R1,P for (M, n) = (6, 3), as a function
of ρ(MI).
performs far from the optimal tradeoff curve. Note that for
both (M, n) = (6, 2) and (6, 3) the converse bound from
Theorem 7 is trivial.
In Figs. 8 to 10, the corresponding curves for the MaxL
privacy metric are depicted. In particular, the figures show
results for (M, n) = (3, 2), (6, 2), and (6, 3), respectively.
Note that with the MaxL privacy metric the converse bound
from Theorem 9 is tight for the canonical case of (M, n) =
(2, 2) (see Theorem 10). Hence, in contrast to Fig. 5, where
(M, n) = (2, 2), we use (M, n) = (3, 2) in Fig. 8. From
Fig. 9, for (M, n) = (6, 2), Scheme 1 with {Sj}M−1j=1 i.i.d.
according to Bernoulli(p) (from Theorem 3) exhibits a lower
download rate than partition Scheme 1 (from Theorem 4),
which is in contrast to the case of MI leakage where partition
Scheme 1 performs significantly worse (see Fig. 6). Moreover,
the gap to the optimized rate R¯(·)opt is higher than with the MI
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Fig. 8. The optimized rate R¯(MaxL)opt for the time-sharing Scheme 1 and R
(MaxL)
UB
for (M, n) = (3, 2), as a function of ρ(MaxL).
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Fig. 9. The optimized rate R¯(MaxL)opt , R1, and R1,P for (M, n) = (6, 2), as a
function of ρ(MaxL).
privacy metric. For (M, n) = (6, 3), Fig. 10 shows that the gap
in download rate between the optimized rate R¯(·)opt and the rate
from partition Scheme 1 is smaller than with the MI privacy
metric, which indicates that partition Scheme 1 performs better
with the MaxL privacy metric than with the MI privacy metric.
For both (M, n) = (6, 2) and (6, 3) (as for the MI privacy
metric) the converse bound from Theorem 9 is trivial.
X. CONCLUSION
We presented the first study of the tradeoffs that can be
achieved by relaxing the perfect privacy requirement of PIR,
referred to as WPIR, for the case of multiple replicated non-
colluding servers. Two WPIR schemes based on two different
PIR protocols and a family of schemes based on partitioning
were proposed. The proposed model shows that by relaxing
the perfect privacy requirement, the download rate, the upload
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Fig. 10. The optimized rate R¯(MaxL)opt and R1,P for (M, n) = (6, 3), as a
function of ρ(MaxL).
cost, and the access complexity can be improved. Under the
MI and MaxL privacy metrics and with a practical restriction
on the alphabet size of queries and answers, we provided an
information-theoretic converse bound on the download rate.
For the MaxL privacy metric and for two servers and two
files, the converse bound is tight, giving the WPIR capacity in
this special case. Numerous numerical results were presented,
comparing the performance of the proposed schemes and their
gap to the new converse bound.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From the theorem statement, the entries {Sj}M−1j=1 of the
random strategy S are assumed to be i.i.d. according to
Bernoulli(p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 . Hence, PQ1(0) = PS(0) =
(1− p)M−1, and we have
R(C1) =
1[
1− (1− p)M−1]+ 1
from the general formula in (14).
For the upload cost, access complexity, and the information
leakage metrics, we first derive the PMF of Ql, l = 1, 2. Let
us consider a query ql to the l-th server that has wH(ql) = w.
Due to the query generation, we have
PQl|M (ql|m) =
{
(1− p)M−w−1pw if m ∈ [M] \ χ(ql),
(1− p)M−wpw−1 if m ∈ χ(ql).
(28)
By using the law of total probability, we obtain
PQl(ql) =
M∑
m′=1
1
M
PQl|M (ql|m′)
=
1
M
[(
M− w
1
)
· (1− p)M−w−1 · pw
+
(
w
1
)
· (1− p)M−w · pw−1
]
= f(w, p).
From the query generation (see Section IV-1), it follows that
wH(q1) must be even and wH(q2) must be odd for the case
of n = 2 servers, hence, the upload cost is equal to
U(C1) = H(Q1) + H(Q2)
= −
M∑
w=0
(
M
w
)
f(w, p) log2
(
f(w, p)
)
.
Further, by the definition in (6), the access complexity
∆(C1) = ∆1 follows.
Moreover, we have
H(Ql |M) = 1
M
M∑
m=1
H(S) = (M− 1)Hb(p), (29)
where (29) holds by the query generation, the fact that the
entropy of i.i.d. RVs is equal to the sum of the individual
entropies, and Sj ∼ Bernoulli(p). Hence, we obtain
ρ(MI) =
H(Q1)− H(Q1 |M) + H(Q2)− H(Q2 |M)
2
=
1
2
U1 − (M− 1)Hb(p).
For the WIL metric, applying Bayes’ rule, given M = m
and a query ql with wH(ql) = w, we get
PM |Ql(m|ql) =
PQl|M (ql|m)∑M
m′=1 PQl|M (ql|m′)
, (30)
where (30) holds since the requested file index M is assumed
to be uniformly distributed. Finally, since the requested index
m ∈ [M] either belongs to [M] \ χ(ql) or χ(ql), it is not too
difficult to see that
PM |Ql(m|ql)
=

(1−p)M−w−1pw
(M−w)(1−p)M−w−1pw+w(1−p)M−wpw−1
if m ∈ [M] \ χ(ql),
(1−p)M−wpw−1
(M−w)(1−p)M−w−1pw+w(1−p)M−wpw−1
if m ∈ χ(ql),
(31)
where (31) follows from (28). Note that to compute the entropy
H(M |Ql = ql), we only need to know the conditional PMF
of M given Ql = ql, hence, we can introduce a new RV
Mw ≡ Mql with wH(ql) = w that has an equivalent PMF
defined as (15). This then gives ρ(WIL)1 .
Finally, we derive the expression for ρ(MaxL)1 . From (28), it
follows that
max
m∈[M]
PQl|M (ql|m)
=
{
(1− p)M−1 if wH(ql) = 0,
(1− p)M−wpw−1 otherwise.
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Moreover,
p
(
2MaxL(M ;Q1) − 2MaxL(M ;Q2))
= p(1− p)M−1 +
∑
w∈[2:M]
w : even
(
M
w
)
(1− p)M−wpw
−
∑
w∈[M]
w : odd
(
M
w
)
(1− p)M−wpw
=
∑
w∈[0:M]
(
M
w
)
(1− p)M−w(−p)w
− (1− p)M + p(1− p)M−1
=
[
(1− p)− p]M − (1− p)M−1(1− 2p) < 0, (32)
where (32) follows by binomial expansion. Since (32) is
nonpositive when 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, the expression for ρ(MaxL)1
follows immediately.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Since the (M/η, n) Scheme 1 with {Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. ac-
cording to U([0 : n− 1]) is used as a subscheme, from Sec-
tion IV-B1, we have
PQl|M (ql|(j − 1)M/η +m′) =
(
n
M/η−1)−1, (33)
j ∈ [η], m′ ∈ [M/η], ∀ ql ∈ Ql, l ∈ [n]. Similar to
Appendix A, we obtain
PQl(ql)
(a)
=
{
1
M
∑M
m=1 PQl|M (ql|m) if ql = 0,
1
M
∑
m∈Pj PQl|M (ql|m) otherwise
=
{
M
M
(
nM/η−1
)−1
if ql = 0,
M/η
M
(
nM/η−1
)−1
otherwise
=
{(
nM/η−1
)−1
if l = 1 and ql = 0,(
η · nM/η−1)−1 otherwise,
where (a) holds since in Scheme 1 the user can send the all-
zero query to the first server to request any file in any partition
group. Since PQ1(0) =
(
nM/η−1
)−1
, using (14) gives
R(C part1 ) =
n− 1[
1− (nM/η−1)−1]+ (n− 1) = R1,P.
For the upload cost, since there are η
[
nM/η−1−1] equally-
likely nonzero queries in Q1, it can be shown that
H(Q1) =
1
nM/η−1
log2
(
n
M/η−1)
+ η
[
n
M/η−1 − 1] · 1
η · nM/η−1 log2
(
η · nM/η−1)
= (M/η − 1) log2 n+ log2 η −
log2 η
nM/η−1
.
Similarly, we have H(Ql) = (M/η − 1) log2 n + log2 η for
all l ∈ [2 : n]. This then gives the expression for U(C part1 ) =
U1,P.
For the access complexity, recall that Scheme 1 partitions
all M files into equally-sized M/η groups and Scheme 1 with
{Sj}M/η−1j=1 i.i.d. according to U([0 : n− 1]) is treated as a
subscheme for each partition group. Thus, we have
∆(C part1 ) =
n∑
l=1
EQl [δl(Ql)]
=
n∑
l=1
∑
ql∈Ql
wH(ql)PQl(ql)
(a)
=
∑
w∈[0:M/η]
w>0
w · η
(
M/η
w
)
(n− 1)w 1
η · nM/η−1
=
∑
w∈[0:M/η]
w>0
w
(
M/η
w
)
(n− 1)w−1 n− 1
nM/η−1
(b)
=
n− 1
nM/η−1
· (M/η · nM/η−1) = (n− 1)M/η,
where (a) follows since for each partition group, (11) indicates
that an (M/η, n) Scheme 1 consists of in total
(M/η
w
)
(n− 1)w
nonzero queries with Hamming weight w in
⋃n
l=1Ql; (b)
is due to the fact that
∑z
h=0 h
(
z
h
) · xh−1 = ddx (1 + x)z =
d
dx
(∑z
h=0
(
z
h
)
xh
)
= z(1 + x)z−1 for some z ∈ N.
For the information leakage metric ρ(MI), similar to (29),
we have
H(Ql |M) = (M/η − 1)H(1/n, . . . , 1/n) = (M/η − 1) log2 n,
l ∈ [n], and hence ρ(MI)(C part1 ) = U1,P/n− (M/η− 1) log2 n =
ρ
(MI)
1,P is achievable.
Under the WIL metric ρ(WIL), if wH(ql) = 0, we obtain
PM |Ql(m|ql) = 1M , ∀m ∈ [M], while PM |Ql((j − 1)M/η +
m′|ql) = 1M/η for wH(ql) > 0, i ∈ [η], m′ ∈ [M/η]. Therefore,
we obtain
H(M |Ql = ql) =
{
log2M if ql = 0,
log2
(
M/η
)
otherwise.
Because log2
(
M/η
) ≤ log2M for η ∈ [M − 1], the achiev-
ability of ρ(WIL)(C part1 ) = ρ
(WIL)
1,P follows.
For the privacy metric ρ(MaxL), it follows from (33) that
2ρ
(MaxL)
= 2MaxL(M ;Ql)
=
∑
ql∈Ql
max
m∈[M]
PQl|M (ql|m)
= |Ql| ·
(
n
M/η−1)−1
=
{(
1 + η
(
nM/η−1 − 1)) · (nM/η−1)−1 < η for l = 1,
η · nM/η−1 · (nM/η−1)−1 = η for l ∈ [2 : n],
which implies that ρ(MaxL)(C part1 ) = η = ρ
(MaxL)
1,P .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
When the user requests the M -th file, the (M, 2) Scheme 2
sends Q1 = S + vM and Q2 = S to the respective servers,
where vM is the M -th M-dimensional unit vector. As the
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random strategy S ∼ U(Bw,M) is taken, it is not too hard to
see that
PQ1(q1) =

w+1
(Mw)M
if q1 ∈ Bw+1,M,
M−(w−1)
(Mw)M
if q1 ∈ Bw−1,M,
Pr[Q2 = q2] = 1/(Mw), q2 ∈ Bw,M, and M ⊥ Q2.
Since H(Ql |M) = H(S) = log2
(
M
w
)
, the results of U(C2),
∆(C2), and ρ(MI)(C2) with S ∼ U(Bw,M) can be determined
by a simple deduction.
Moreover, one can also show that
H(M |Q1 = q1) =
{
log2 (w + 1) if q1 ∈ Bw+1,M,
log2
(
M− (w − 1)) if q1 ∈ Bw−1,M.
On the other hand, it can be seen that for q1 ∈ Bw+1,M,
PQ1|M (q1|m) =
{
1/(Mw) if m ∈ χ(q1),
0 otherwise,
and for q1 ∈ Bw−1,M,
PQ1|M (q1|m) =
{
1/(Mw) if m ∈ [M] \ χ(q1),
0 otherwise.
Therefore, from the above we obtain the expressions for ρ(WIL)2,U
and ρ(MaxL)2,U .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The lemma can be shown by combining Lemma 4 with a
similar approach to the one of the converse proofs given in
the information theory literature for PIR, see, e.g., [7], [36],
[53]. To make the paper self-contained, we repeat some basic
steps here.
The first objective is to find an upper bound on
the absolute value of the entropy difference H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣
Q
(m)
l ,X
M,X(m)
) − H(A(m′)l ∣∣Q(m′)l ,XM,X(m)) subject
to I(M ;Ql) ≤ ρl, ∀ l ∈ [n], where m,m′ /∈M ( [M− 1].
Observe that∣∣∣H(A(m)l ∣∣Q(m)l ,XM,X(m))
− H(A(m′)l ∣∣Q(m′)l ,XM,X(m))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(A(m)l ,Q(m)l ∣∣XM,X(m))− H(Q(m)l ∣∣XM,X(m))
− H(A(m′)l ,Q(m′)l ∣∣XM,X(m))
+ H
(
Q
(m′)
l
∣∣XM,X(m))∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣H(A(m)l ,Q(m)l ∣∣XM,X(m))
− H(A(m′)l ,Q(m′)l ∣∣XM,X(m))∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣H(Q(m)l ∣∣XM,X(m))− H(Q(m′)l ∣∣XM,X(m))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(Al,Ql ∣∣XM,X(m),M = m)
− H(Al,Ql ∣∣XM,X(m),M = m′)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣H(Ql ∣∣XM,X(m),M = m)
− H(Ql ∣∣XM,X(m),M = m′)∣∣∣
≤ MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql), (34)
where the inequality (34) can be justified as follows. Using
the Markov chain M (− Ql(− Al and (2), we have
I(M ;Ql,Al |XM,X(m))
= I(M ;Ql |XM,X(m)) + I(M ;Al |Ql,XM,X(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= I(M ;Ql) = ρl.
Hence, (34) follows from Lemmas 3 and 4. In addition, (34)
implies that
H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)l ,XM,X(m))
≥ H(A(m′)l ∣∣Q(m′)l ,XM,X(m))
− [MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)], (35)
for all l ∈ [n].
Now, due to (1) we know that
H
(
A
(m)
[n]
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM)
= H
(
X(m),A
(m)
[n]
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM)
− H(X(m) ∣∣A(m)[n] ,Q(m)[n] ,XM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= H
(
X(m)
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM)+ H(A(m)[n] ∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m))
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m)
[n]
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m))
− H(A(m)[n] ∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m),XMc\{m})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= β log2 |X |+ I
(
A
(m)
[n] ;X
Mc\{m} ∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m))
= β log2 |X |
+ I
(
A
(m)
[n] ,Q
(m)
[n] ;X
Mc\{m} ∣∣XM,X(m)) (36)
≥ β log2 |X |
+ I
(
A
(m)
l ,Q
(m)
[n] ;X
Mc\{m} ∣∣XM,X(m)) (37)
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m)
l ,Q
(m)
[n]
∣∣XM,X(m))
− H(A(m)l ,Q(m)[n] ∣∣XM,X(m),XMc\{m})
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
Q
(m)
[n]
∣∣XM,X(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
= H
(
Q
(m)
[n]
)
+ H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m))
− H(Q(m)[n] ∣∣XM,X(m),XMc\{m})︸ ︷︷ ︸
= H
(
Q
(m)
[n]
)
− H(A(m)l ∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m),XMc\{m})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM,X(m)),
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m)
l
∣∣Q(m)l ,XM,X(m)), (38)
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≥ β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m′)
l
∣∣Q(m′)l ,XM,X(m))
− [MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)], (39)
= β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m′)
l
∣∣Q(m′)[n] ,XM,X(m))
− [MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)], (40)
for any l ∈ [n], where (36) follows from (2), (37) holds by
the chain rule for MI, and the final inequality (39) is due to
(35).
Thus, summing (40) over all possible l ∈ [n] we have
nH
(
A
(m)
[n]
∣∣Q(m)[n] ,XM)
≥ nβ log2 |X |+
n∑
l=1
H
(
A
(m′)
l
∣∣Q(m′)[n] ,XM,X(m))
−
n∑
l=1
[
MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)
]
≥ nβ log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(m′)
[n]
∣∣Q(m′)[n] ,XM,X(m))
−
n∑
l=1
[
MI(Ql,A) + MI(Ql)
]
.
The result of (21) then follows by dividing both sides by n.
On the other hand, following a similar derivation as (38),
we can obtain
H
(
A
(M)
[n]
∣∣Q(M)[n] ,X [M−1])
≥ β log2 |X |+ H
(
A
(M)
l
∣∣Q(M)l ,X(M),X [M−1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
This completes the proof of (22).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We start the proof by defining a set Bx,x′ , {x, x′} with two
arbitrary elements x 6= x′, x, x′ ∈ X , and a subset Zx,x′ ⊆ Y
as {y ∈ Y : PY |X(y|x) ≥ PY |X(y|x′)}. Next, we introduce a
new RV Zx,x′ as
Zx,x′(y) =
{
1 if y ∈ Zx,x′ ,
0 otherwise.
By (5) we have∑
z∈{0,1}
max
b∈Bx,x′
PZx,x′ |X(z|b)
=
∑
y∈Zx,x′
PY |X(y|x) +
∑
y∈Zc
x,x′
PY |X(y|x′)
(a)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
b∈Bx,x′
PY |X(y|b)
(b)
≤
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) ≤ 2ρ,
where (a) follows by the definition of the subset of Zx,x′ ,
and (b) holds simply because maximizing over a subset leads
to a smaller value. Moreover, by using the relation between
TV distance and variational distance [50, Lem. 3.11], it follows
that ∥∥∥PZx,x′ |X=x − PZx,x′ |X=x′∥∥∥TV
=
1
2
(∣∣∣PZx,x′ |X(1|x)− PZx,x′ |X(1|x′)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣PZx,x′ |X(0|x)− PZx,x′ |X(0|x′)∣∣∣)
=
1
2
( ∑
y∈Zx,x′
[
PY |X=x(y)− PY |X=x′(y)
]
+
∑
y∈Zc
x,x′
[
PY |X=x′(y)− PY |X=x(y)
])
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∣∣PY |X=x(y)− PY |X=x′(y)∣∣
=
∥∥PY |X=x − PY |X=x′∥∥TV.
Therefore, since x, x′ are chosen arbitrarily, Lemma 6 holds
for any alphabets X and Y if we can show that the assertion
is true when X and Y are binary.
To complete the proof, we show that Lemma 6 holds for
any binary RVs X and Y . The proof is quite straightforward:
Since X = Y = {0, 1}, we can define PY |X as a , PY |X(1|0)
and b , PY |X(1|1) with 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. Thus, by defini-
tion ‖PY |X=0 − PY |X=1‖TV = |a− b| and MaxL(X ;Y ) =
log2
(
max{1−a, 1−b}+max{a, b}) = log2(1+|a− b|) ≤ ρ.
As log2(·) is a strictly increasing function, |a− b| ≤ 2ρ − 1.
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